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I Introduction 
Until the early 1960s, many economists viewed the continued existence of 
small-scale industries in less developed countries as justified by scarcity of 
capital and administrative experience. It was often argued that with economic 
growth, the small, traditional type of enterprise would, in one sector after 
another, be superseded by modern forms of large-scale production. In order to 
ensure an orderly transition, small industries were seen to deserve support, but 
mainly in sectors where modern methods could not be immediately applied. 
In the mid-1960s a new approach to small to medium-scale enterprise 
(SME) development began to emerge due to a number of factors. First, there 
was growing concern over low employment elasticity of modern, large-scale 
production. It was claimed that even with more optimal policies, this form of 
industrial organization was unable to absorb a significant proportion of the 
rapidly expanding labour force (Chenery et al., 1974; ILO, 1973). Second, 
there was widespread recognition that the benefits of economic growth were 
not being fairly distributed, and that the use of large-scale, capital-intensive 
techniques was partly to blame (Chenery et al, 1974). Third, empirical 
diagnosis showed that the causes of poverty were not confined to 
unemployment, and that most of the poor were employed in a large variety of 
small-scale, low-productivity activities. Thus, it was thought that one way to 
alleviate poverty could be to increase the productivity of those engaged in 
small-scale production (Aftab and Rahim, 1989). 
This suggested a new role for small industries, or what has come to be 
labelled "the urban informal sector". Small, labour-intensive industries were 
seen not only to increase employment, but also to increase the living standards 
of the poor. They were also thought to be capable of providing a new dynamic 
of economic growth. The new objective was not just to stop the retreat, but to 
promote the small-scale sector (Schmitz, 1982; Aftab and Rahim, 1989). 
This change in approach was accompanied by a shift of focus towards a 
"rurally orientated smallholder" (ROSH) industrialization strategy, well 
articulated in Oshima (1962), UNDP (1974), Kilby (1975), Acharya (1981), 
Daniel et al (1985), and Olofin (1990), among others. 
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While the World Bank (1989) and others have tended to favour the ROSH 
implementation strategy by assigning the major role to the private sector, there 
are those who favour its implementation by assigning a major role to 
government (Olofin, 1990). Assigning the major role to the private sector has 
its appeal in the fact that the private sector has the resources needed to 
implement the strategy. But the proponents of assigning the role to the 
government are aware that in many developing economies, government is the 
major mover of the economy with only a small and sometimes weak private 
sector. Thus, they argue that assigning such an important role to the private 
sector would not work. Besides, for the strategy to produce an optimal effect 
on the well-being of the people, the social environment has to be considered — 
something the private sector may not be willing to do. 
Kilby (1969) sees SMEs as a quasi sponge for urban employment and a 
provider of inexpensive consumer goods with little or no import content, 
serving an important pressure-releasing and welfare-augmenting function. 
SMEs also contribute to long-run industrial growth by producing an increasing 
number of firms that grow up and out of the small-scale sector. The emergence 
of wholly modern small/medium-scale Nigerian industries is likely to be a pre-
requisite for any enduring industrialization. 
However, despite government efforts in Nigeria to promote SMEs, not much 
progress seems to have been achieved, judging by SME performance. This 
study examines survey data in order to evaluate the characteristics of SMEs 
that make it more difficult for them to be profitable and the particular 
problems that they face which may have contributed to their poor performance. 
Objectives of the study 
In order to examine these issues, the following research questions have been 
raised: 
1. what are the characteristics of the SMEs with reference to the educational 
background of the operators, their training and experience before embarking 
on the business, the type of business they operate, and the size of the 
enterprise? 
2. what are their sources of funds (formal or informal institutions)? 
3. is there any relationship between the two markets as shown in the service 
they provide, e.g. are these two markets complementary, competitive, 
dualistic, or is one a substitute for the other? 
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4. how have government policies affected the development of SMEs and their 
sources of funds? 
II Characteristics of SMEs in Nigeria 
Defining SMEs 
There is no generally accepted definition of a small business because the 
classification of businesses into large-scale or small-scale is a subjective and 
qualitative judgement. In countries such as the USA, Britain, and Canada, 
small-scale business is defined in terms of annual turnover and the number of 
paid employees. In Britain, small-scale business is defined as that industry with 
an annual turnover of 2 million pounds or less with fewer than 200 paid 
employees. 
In Japan, small-scale industry is defined according to the type of industry, 
paid-up capital and number of paid employees. Consequently, small and 
medium-scale enterprises are defined as: those in manufacturing with 100 
million yen paid-up capital and 300 employees, those in wholesale trade with 
30 million yen paid-up capital and 100 employees, and those in the retail and 
service trades with 10 million yen paid-up capital and 50 employees. 
In Nigeria, there is no clear-cut definition that distinguishes a purely small-
scale enterprise from a medium-scale enterprise. The Central Bank of Nigeria, 
in its Monetary Policy Circular No. 22 of 1988, defined small-scale enterprises 
as having an annual turnover not exceeding 500,000 naira. In the 1990 budget, 
the federal government of Nigeria defined small-scale enterprises for purposes 
of commercial bank loans as those with an annual turnover not exceeding 
500,000 naira, and for Merchant Bank Loans, those enterprises with capital 
investments not exceeding 2 million naira (excluding cost of land) or a 
maximum of 5 million naira. The National Economic Reconstruction Fund 
(NERFUND) put the ceiling for small-scale industries at 10 million naira. 
Section 37b(2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990 defines 
a small company as one with: 
(a) an annual turnover of not more than 2 million naira; 
(b) net asset value of not more than 1 million naira. 
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For the purposes of this study, small and medium-scale enterprises are defined 
as those with investments in machinery and equipment not exceeding 500,000 
naira and 2 million naira, respectively, with not more than 50 and 100 paid 
employees, respectively. This definition does not reflect the characteristics of 
typical Nigerian small-scale enterprises in terms of their capital base and 
number of employees. The definition may at best relate to medium-scale 
enterprises. Small-scale enterprises in Nigeria require a separate definition. 
Methodology 
The study used the questionnaire/interview approach. Because of the absence 
of a sampling frame, the focus was by type of business, categorized ^s: 
• one-man business 
• partnership 
• co-operative 
• family business 
8 private limited company 
8 public limited company. 
Through a purposeful sampling in both Lagos and Oyo States of Nigeria, 150 
enterprises engaged in the six related types of business operations were 
selected. Of these, 80 were based in Lagos State, while 70 were based in Oyo 
State. 
Survey execution 
The major problem encountered was identifying the relevant enterprises and 
those that faced complete failure at the time of the survey. There was also the 
usual hesitation to complete questionnaires or respond to questions during 
interviews as many of the respondents took us for government officials or 
agents. People were also reluctant to talk about lending and borrowing. 
Because of these problems, it was decided that a one-time interview would 
not provide the best research instrument. Instead, repeated visits, to the 
enterprises were used to ensure that relevant and useful data were obtained. 
The data, which are considered reasonably reliable, were obtained only after 
much patience, prodding, visits and assurance that any information provided 
would be used for research purposes only and would be treated in confidence. 
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The interview process took nine weeks (July-September 1990), of which 
two weeks were spent in locating the enterprises and seven weeks in the 
interviews and administration of the questionnaires. 
A major limitation of the study, which has affected the analysis of some of 
the results, was the failure to identify the exact time when those enterprises 
that failed actually went out of business. 
Characteristics of SMEs based on study findings 
In line with one of the objectives of the study, information was sought with 
respect to certain characteristics of the SMEs (and their operators), including 
the educational background of the operators, their training and experience 
before embarking on the project, the type of business they operate, and the size 
of the enterprise. 
Educational background 
All the respondents were asked questions related to their educational 
background (Table 1) and previous experience (Table 2). Later, the enterprises 
that failed completely (10 of them) were singled out to test in what respect 
they were different from the rest (see Table 3). 
Table 1 Educational background of SME operators 
Level of education Frequency Percentage 
Primary 73 49 
Secondary 53 35 
Tertiary 
University 
Polytechnic 
18 
6 
12 
4 
Total 150 100 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
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The results show that few of the respondents had tertiary education (16 per 
cent) while the majority had primary and secondary education (84 per cent). 
Results in Table 3 show that operators of 8 out of the 10 (about 80 per cent) 
enterprises that failed had secondary education, with only one having gone 
through the polytechnic. Both Tables 1 and 3 show that most of the operators 
of the enterprises that failed and those that did not fail had primary and 
secondary education. 
Previous work experience 
The study further sought to establish the level of experience of the operators 
of the enterprises prior to commencing the current business. Table 2 shows that 
many of the respondents had no previous experience in business before 
embarking on their current business activity. Most of them had a maximum of 
5 years' experience with only 5 per cent having had more than 15 years' 
experience. 
Table 2 Experience prior to commencing current business 
Years of experience Frequency Percentage 
0 years 41 28 
1-5 years 79 53 
6-15 years 22 14 
Over 15 years 8 5 
Total 150 100 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
The results in Table 3 show that 6 out of the 10 enterprises (60 per cent) that 
failed had no previous experience, 3 (30 per cent) had 0-5 years experience, 
and only 1 (10 per cent) had 5-15 years of experience. This indicates a strong 
correlation between lack of experience and business failure. 
Table 3 Features of respondent companies which failed oo 
Type of business Ownership 
Educational level of 
owners-managers 
Work experience 
before entering 
business (years) Reason for failure 
Import and export 
Hotel 
Supermarket 
Motor dealer 
Clearing and forwarding 
Electronic stores 
Private ltd company Secondary 
a. One man business Secondary 
b. Private ltd company Secondary 
One man business Secondary 
Private ltd company Secondary 
a. Private ltd company Secondary 
b. Private ltd company Secondary 
One-man business Secondary 
0 
0-5 
0 
0 
5-15 
0 
0 
0 
Banning of goods importation 
Reduced patronage and 
inaccessibility to finance 
because of stringent credit 
policies and high interest rates 
Banning of goods importation 
Banning of car importation 
Banning of importation of many 
items 
Bann ing of e lec t ron ics 
importation and lack of finance 
due to high interest rate and 
stringent credit policy 23 m w m > 
n 0 1 
"0 > 
•0 m ao 
o> 
Table 3 cont ... a> s > 
Type of business Ownership 
Work experience 
Educational level of before entering 
owners-managers business (years) Reason for failure 
> 2 O 
<: m g 
c 2 
CO o > 
r~ m 
m 
m 
ZD -o 
« 
rn w 
Road construction 
Fast food 
Private ltd company Secondary 
Private ltd company Polytechnic 
0-5 
0-5 
Embargo on award of new 
contracts by government 
Inaccessibility to finance, and 
demolition of illegal structures 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
Q 
m 
> 
CO 
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Type of business 
Failure was related more to the service-orientated type of businesses which 
also depended largely on imported components. They included those engaged 
in import and export, clearing and forwarding, motor dealership, electronics, 
and road construction. At various times before the liberalization of the 
economy, the government instituted several restrictive measures that worked 
against import-dependent enterprises. 
Ownership structure 
Table 4 shows that most of the companies were engaged in service-related 
activities with most of the ownership structure being sole proprietorship and 
partnership. Table 3 further shows that the failed enterprises were either a one-
man business or a private limited liability company. 
Capital base 
The amount of money needed for business operations can directly influence the 
sources which the investor will approach. Some have argued that small 
enterprises with a small capital base would tend to use the informal financial 
institutions. As Table 4 shows, about 66 per cent of the enterprises covered in 
the study had a capital base of less than 100,000 naira, and about 34 per cent 
had a capital base of between 100,000 and 2 million naira. 
Table 4 Relationship between capital base, number of employees, financing sources and type of business 
Types of business Companies (no.) Employees (no.) Capital base (naira) Structure Sources 
Food and beverages 6 1-20 <100,000 Partnership PS, CB 
2 21-50 100,000 < X < 2m Partnership MB, R, F 
Brick-making 8 1-20 <100,000 Partnership PS, ML, R, CS 
Road-side mechanics 10 1-20 <100,000 Partnership PS, R, E, F, ML 
Printing 8 1-20 100,000 < X < 2m Partnership PS, R, CB, ML 
2 1-20 <100,000 Partnership F 
Fast food 8 1-20 <100,000 Partnership PS, F, R 
2 21-50 100,000 < X < 2m Partnership CB, E 
Electronic stores 2 1-20 100,000 < X < 2m Sole proprietorship PS, R, F 
and partnership 
Road construction 2 21-100 100,000 < X < 2m Partnership PS, CB, MB 
Import and export 2 1-30 100,000 < X < 2m Private ltd liability PS, CB 
and partnership 
Supermarket 2 5-30 100,000 < X < 2m Private ltd liability PS, CS 
and partnership 
Motor dealer 2 4-20 100,000 < X < 2m Private ltd liability PS, CB 
and partnership 
Medicine and pharmacy 4 21-50 100,000 < X < 2m Partnership PS, R, CB 
1-20 <100,000 Partnership F, MB 
Clearing and forwarding 4 1-20 <100,000 Private Ltd company PS, F 
and sole proprietorship 
Carpentry 8 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, F, E, R, CS 
Plumbing 8 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, CS, CB 
Table 4 cont 
Types of business Companies (no.) Employees (no.) Capital base (naira) Structure Sources 
Weaving 10 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, ML, CS, E 
Baking 6 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, CB, F, CB, PS 
.4 21-50 100,000 < X < 2m and partnership R, ML 
Welding 8 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, E, F, ML 
Shoe-making 10 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, E, CS, F, ML 
Tailoring 8 21-50 100,000 < X < 2m Sole proprietorship PS, CB, R 
2 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship MB, E, ML, F, PS 
Pottery 4 1-20 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS 
Hotel management 10 50-100 100,000 < X < 2m Sole proprietorship PS, CB 
4 21-50 <100,000 Sole proprietorship PS, R, F 
2 1-20 <100,000 Private ltd liability PS, MB 
Notes: PS Personal savings 
CB Commercial banks 
MB Merchant banks 
F Friends 
R Relatives 
E Esusu 
CS Co-operative Societies 
ML Money lenders 
Ill Problems of SMEs 
General problems 
Problems associated with SMEs and reasons for their failure have been widely 
identified. Some of these include: lack of planning, inimical government rules 
and regulations, poor marketing strategy, lack of technical know-how, and 
higher interest rates (Aftab and Rahim, 1989; Ekpenyong, 1983; Akamiokor, 
1983). 
Entrepreneurial deficiencies often pose more problems than is usually 
appreciated. The underlying attitudes and dispositions of entrepreneurs, which 
have deep roots in the traditional socio-cultural system, can seriously impede 
development of the entrepreneurial characteristics necessary for good 
performance of Nigerian SMEs. The availability of and accessibility to credit 
is also crucial to the effectiveness of SMEs in Nigeria. For local people to 
generate income from productive activities requires credit, especially to 
stimulate traditional heavily under-capitalized local enterprises. Availability of 
credit, more than any other service, awakens the aspirations of potential 
entrepreneurs. 
Government policies seem to have constituted a serious problem area for 
SMEs. The beginning of harsh government policies toward SMEs can be 
traced back to 1982 with the introduction of "stabilization measures" which 
resulted in import controls and drastic budget cuts. These, in turn, adversely 
affected the subvention to the financial institutions established to provide 
financial assistance to the SMEs. For example, in 1983, out of a total of 8,380 
applications for loans received from the SMEs for a total of 559.13 million 
naira, only 18 per cent (1,470 projects) for a total of 46.66 million naira was 
disbursed. 
As the economic situation deteriorated, the government introduced the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. Since the strategy of 
liberalization and deregulation of interest rates was implemented, interest rates 
have continued to increase. The SMEs, which prior to the SAP had been 
granted concessionary rates of interest (particularly for agricultural and housing 
loans), have had great difficulties obtaining credit. 
14 RESEARCH PAPER 16 
The frequent changes, and sometimes conflicting government monetary 
policies, have also tended to hurt the SMEs. For example, while the 
government increased total credit allocation to SMEs from 16 to 20 per cent, 
the same government removed excess liquidity in the banking industry through 
increases in the minimum rediscount rate (MRR), transfer of government and 
parastatal accounts to the Central Bank and the creation of a Stabilization 
Securities Account (SSA) whereby the banks were debited with excess 
liquidity in their accounts with the Central Bank. 
However, there is a growing awareness that industrialization in developing 
countries can be better achieved through the ROSH strategy, and Nigeria is 
currently focusing its attention in this direction. In 1986, the federal 
government established certain guidelines for the development of SMEs which 
included: 
9 establishing more industrial development centres (IDCs); 
9 establishing model industrial estates to encourage prospective small-scale 
industrialists; 
• exploiting to the fullest existing World Bank-assisted programmes for the 
small-scale enterprises; 
• introducing the "Work-For-Yourself" programme — a drive towards self-
employment; 
• introducing SME-related programmes, such as the Small-Scale Industries 
Scheme; the National Economic Reconstruction Fund; and the Small and 
Medium-Scale Enterprises Loan Scheme. 
Problems determined from the survey results 
The study went further to identify the problems associated with the operations 
of the SMEs that were surveyed. The aspects covered in the survey included: 
government regulations, finance, lack of education and experience, type of 
ownership, type of business, level of capitalization and ability to prepare 
feasibility reports. 
Government regulations 
Reactions by the respondents to government policies as a problem can be 
deduced from Table 3. All the enterprises that failed blamed their failure on 
one government policy or another. 
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As Tables 1 and 3 indicate, the majority of the operators had primary and 
secondary education. The results in both tables did not provide a basis for a 
definite conclusion as to whether low level of education affected performance 
negatively. When the level of awareness of government policies was tested, the 
result showed that generally the respondents were not aware of the existence 
of the various incentives and credit facilities provided by government (see 
Table 5). While no conclusive pattern could be established, Table 5 shows that 
most of those who were not aware of the incentives and credit facilities had 
only primary education. This implies that low education level can negatively 
affect a manager's performance. 
Previous experience 
Table 2 shows that most of the respondents had only 1-5 years of experience 
prior to commencing their current businesses. When those enterprises that 
failed completely were analyzed, as many as 75 per cent of the respondents 
had no previous experience. It can safely be concluded that lack of experience 
coupled with low level of education can constitute problems for SMEs. 
Type of business and ownership structure 
As Tables 3 and 4 show, most of the enterprises surveyed were engaged in 
service-related activities and were either a one-man business or a private 
limited liability company. All of the companies that failed fell into these two 
categories. Most of them had resorted to the informal financial institutions for 
credit. The implication here is that a one-man privately-run enterprise is more 
prone to failure for the following possible reasons: 
9 the operator lacked appropriate skills and expertise as many of the sampled 
population had limited years of previous management experience and still 
more had no experience at all; 
• the one-man type of enterprise encountered several problems, including lack 
of trained personnel, and would not be able to compete in a free market 
economy; 
16 
Table 5 
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Respondents' level of awareness of government credit facilities 
Level of awareness 
Type of credit facility Aware Unaware 
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry 75 75 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 22 52 
Secondary 38 19 
Tertiary: University 11 2 
Polytechnic 4 2 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank 89 61 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 28 41 
Secondary 49 6 
Tertiary: University 8 10 
Polytechnic 4 4 
Small-Scale Industries Credit Scheme 32 118 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 8 77 
Secondary 10 39 
Tertiary: University 12 
Polytechnic 2 2 
SMEs Loan Scheme 28 122 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 4 75 
Secondary 10 43 
Tertiary: University 10 4 
Polytechnic 4 -
NERFUND 45 105 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 10 71 
Secondary 25 28 
Tertiary: University 8 4 
Polytechnic 2 2 
Work-for-Yourself programme 38 112 
Respondents' level of education 
Primary 10 70 
Secondary 16 38 
Tertiary: University 8 4 
Polytechnic 4 -
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
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• such enterprises would have difficulty gaining access to the formal financial 
institutions for credit but would be a good customer of the informal 
financial institutions. 
Capital base 
Table 4 shows that most of the enterprises had a capital base of less than 
100,000 naira. As the amount of money needed for business operators can 
directly influence the sources which the investor will approach for credit, small 
enterprises with a small capital base would tend to use the informal financial 
institutions as their sources of financing. Table 4 shows that all the enterprises 
with a capital base of less than 100,000 naira turned more to the informal 
financial institutions for their financing than to the formal institutions. 
Feasibility study 
None of the respondents in this study had prepared a feasibility study before 
embarking on their projects. Instead, they relied on their past experience in 
business (which many of them did not have) and on the fact that others in the 
same line of business before them were successful without going through the 
intricacies of a feasibility report. 
Although findings in this study are not conclusive, it is widely accepted that 
failure to carry out a feasibility study before embarking upon a project can 
pose serious problems to the operators. Besides, no serious lender in Nigeria 
would lend to an investor without evidence that the project is bankable. 
IV Sources of finance 
Potential sources of finance 
There is wide consensus in Nigeria that government policies are made in 
favour of the formal sector and against the informal sector. This unfavourable 
situation weighs heavily on the SMEs. While formal sector enterprises enjoy 
such direct benefits as access to credit and foreign technology, restriction on 
competition through tariffs and quotas, and trade licensing, the informal sector 
is often ignored and even harassed by the authorities. Enterprises and 
individuals within this sector operate largely outside the system of government 
benefits and regulations and thus have no access to the formal credit 
institutions and the main sources of technology transfer. 
Many of the economic agents within this sector operate illegally, often 
pursuing similar economic activities to those in the formal sector, such as 
marketing foodstuffs and consumer goods, repair and maintenance of 
machinery and consumer durables, and running transport services. Illegality in 
this case is generally not due to the nature of the economic activity but to an 
official limitation of access to legitimate activity (ILO, 1973). These official 
limitations sometimes include requiring enterprises to register their businesses 
and pay high registration fees; file certain statements of accounts; provide 
information about their activities (which the enterprises may consider to be 
confidential); and pay taxes, etc. These conditions have tended to limit not 
only the activities of SMEs but also their sources of financing. 
There are three main sources of enterprise financing open to SMEs in 
Nigeria: 
• formal financial institutions such as commercial banks, merchant banks, 
savings banks, insurance companies, and development banks; 
• informal financial institutions consisting of money lenders, landlords, credit 
and savings associations (co-operative societies); esusu,1 friends and 
relations; 
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o personal savings. 
The majority of SMEs in Nigeria, having been harassed or merely tolerated by 
government and scorned by the formal financial institutions with respect to 
access to credit, have resorted to alternative sources of financing among the 
informal financial institutions. According to a study by Leonard (1977) on 
sources of agricultural credit and finance in West Kwara State of Nigeria, 
about 82 per cent of farmers sampled obtained credit from non-institutional 
sources (of which 58 per cent from friends and relatives, and 24 per cent from 
money lenders). 
A study by Ojo (1984) on the courses of investment finance for small 
industries shows a similar trend (Table 6). Table 6 shows that almost all the 
funds came from personal savings (96.4 per cent) with about 3 per cent from 
the informal sector and 0.21 per cent from the formal financial institutions. 
The trend is further established by a 1983/84 study by the Nigerian Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (NISER) (Table 7). Table 7 shows that 
about 73 per cent of the respondents obtained their funds from personal 
savings while only about 2 per cent obtained their funds from the formal 
financial institutions. 
Sources of finance based on survey 
Having discussed the potential sources of finance generally, the study sought 
to determine the sources of finance used by the specific enterprises covered in 
the study. Tables 8-11 show the results. Table 8 shows that about 10 per cent 
of the funds generated for the initial investment came from informal 
institutions. The bulk of the funds came from personal savings and the formal 
institutions. The pattern changed when those enterprises sought additional 
capital as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 shows a significant shift from personal savings and banks to the 
informal financial institutions. There were certain specific departures from the 
initial situation: 
• the percentage of dependence on the informal financial institutions increased 
from about 10 per cent to about 56 per cent; 
8 the type of formal institution also changed, for example, no additional funds 
were sought from the merchant banks; 
9 fewer enterprises turned to the commercial banks. 
Table 6 Sources of investment finance for small industries in Nigeria ro o 
Former Bendel 
Source of Western State Kwara Lagos Total 
finance - State (respondents) State State responses Percentage 
Owners' savings 
Assisted by: 
Banks 
Government institutions 
Local authorities 
Co-operative societies 
Relatives and friends 
Money lenders 
Total 
13,273 2,709 1,023 4,156 26,161 96.4 
22 10 1 14 47 0.21 
1 - 5 3 9 0.04 
- 7 - - 7 0.03 
4 8 - 1 13 0.06 
25 322 3 61 640 2.92 
38 27 - 7 72 0.33 
13,592 3,083 1,032 4,242 21,949 100.00 
Source: Ojo (1976, 1984). 
Table 7 Percentage distribution of industry group by sources of capital 
Sources of capital 
Industry 
categories 
Private 
Nigerian 
Private non-
Nigerian 
State 
government 
Personal 
savings 
Co-operative Commercial and Local 
societies development banks authorities Total 
Non-durable 
consumer goods 7.76 0.40 0.78 41.64 0.85 0.89 0.08 52.40 
Durable 
consumer goods 6.17 0.04 1.90 14.01 0.23 0.70 0.08 23.13 
Capital goods 6.28 0.15 0.23 17.27 0.31 0.23 24.47 
Total 20.21 0.59 2.91 72.92 1.39 1.82 0.16 100.00 
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Source: NISER Survey 1983/84. 
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Source 
Amount 
generated (naira) Percentage 
Personal savings 
Relatives 
Friends 
Money lenders 
Others (esusu) 
Foreigners 
Co-operative societies 
Commercial banks 
Merchant banks 
State government 
Local government 
Total 
2,846,900 
223,900 
168,500 
136,000 
41,500 
1,719,000 
310,000 
5,445,800 
52.28 
4.11 
3.09 
2.50 
0.76 
31.57 
5.69 
100.00 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990 
Table 9 Sources of additional capital 
Source 
Amount 
generated (naira) Percentage 
Friends 56,500 11.37 
Relatives 32,500 7.14 
Money lenders 182,000 36.62 
Esusu 6,000 1.21 
Commercial banks 132,000 26.56 
Co-operative societies 85,000 17.10 
Total 494,000 100.00 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
As Table 10 shows, there was a significant shift to money lenders, co-
operative societies, friends and relatives for additional investment funds. There 
was also a decrease in the number of those who raised additional capital f rom 
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the commercial banks and esusu. The reason for the shift from esusu, although 
not established from the responses, can be linked to the small-holdings of the 
esusu groups which might not have been in a position to support loans of this 
size. It might also not have been the turn of the intending borrower to be 
granted loans at the time the request was made. However, the shift from esusu 
is compensated by a shift to co-operative societies. Definitive proof of this 
would require further investigation. 
Table 10 Sources of financing for initial and additional investments (%) 
Initial Additional 
Source investment investment Change 
Personal savings 52.3 
Relatives 4.0 7.1 3.1 
Friends 3.1 11.4 8.3 
Money lenders - 36.6 36.6 
Esusu 2.5 1.2 (1.3) 
Foreigners 
Co-operative societies 0.8 17.1 16.3 
Commercial banks 31.6 26.6 (5.0) 
Merchant banks 5.7 
State government 
Local government 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Researchers' Survey Findings, 1990. 
The findings show that no personal savings were involved in the additional 
funding. Thus is understandable as the owners might have exhausted their 
personal savings in providing the initial capital investment. Whether they made 
profits or not requires further investigation. Using all of one's resources in 
starting a business is a bad financial management strategy. A reasonable mix 
between the use of one's personal savings and borrowed funds should be 
maintained at all times. 
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Relationship between the formal and informal institutions 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 reflect a relationship of complementarity between the 
formal and informal markets. Where the SMEs had no more personal funds for 
additional investment, they turned to a large extent to the co-operative 
societies, a quasi-formal institution. 
Although no funds for additional investment were sought from the merchant 
banks, there was still a substantial amount obtained from the commercial 
banks. The ability of the formal financial institutions, such as banks, to provide 
credit to both SMEs and large enterprises, and the ability of the informal 
financial institutions to cater to the predominantly small-medium enteiprises, 
establishes their legitimacy to operate in a complementary fashion. 
Since the deregulation of the financial system through SAP (in 1986) there 
has been much competition, particularly among the formal financial institutions 
and between them and the non-financial institutions. For example, some of the 
banks now operate small offices at marketplaces just to collect deposits from 
the traders and market women. 
The People's Bank 
Difficulties encountered by small-scale enterprises in obtaining credit must 
have influenced the government's decision to establish the People's Bank in 
Nigeria. The People's Bank seems designed to provide credit facilities to 
small-scale enterprises which find it difficult to approach the formal financial 
institutions and are scared away from the informal ones by the high cost of 
b o i T o w i n g . The People's Bank is a formal financial institution which borrows 
from the informal institutions some of those attributes that have facilitated their 
operations: low transactions costs, prompt disbursement of loans, minimal 
paperwork, no collateral, etc. 
The objectives of the People's Bank are: 
• to extend banking facilities to the poor who, lacking collateral, do not have 
access to the credit facilities available from the formal financial institutions; 
• to help cushion some of the painful side-effects of SAP on the poor sectors 
of the economy; 
• to complement government's efforts at improving the productive base of the 
economy and raise rural employment and income; 
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• to inculcate the banking habit especially among the rural poor; 
• to halt rural-urban migration. 
The loan scheme is targeted towards the poor, and covers all kinds of 
business activities, including petty traders, artisans, market women, plumbers, 
food sellers, farmers, housewives, cattle rearers, hair dressers, tailors, barbers, 
and groundnut sellers. 
Before August 1990, the maximum loan amount was fixed at 2,000 naira 
with a 50 naira minimum. An interest rate (service/commission charges) of 5 
per cent was charged. Since August 1990, the maximum loan amount has been 
raised to 5,000 naira and the interest rate raised to 15 per cent. Loan 
repayment is spread over one year, with a two-week grace period. No 
"collateral", e.g. pledging of property, is required of applicants. 
Instead, people applying for a loan with the People's Bank must form 
groups of between 7 and 15 like-minded persons. They must all be engaged 
in some kind of definable business activity, which must be inspected and 
approved. The secretary and chairman of each group receive their loan last, 
after other members have paid back their loans. This serves as an alternative 
to collateral per se. It takes about 2-3 weeks to apply for and obtain a loan 
from this source. 
Table 11 reflects the extent of the operation of the People's Bank loan 
scheme to date in Lagos and Oyo States. Data from Lagos State, where the 
gender of applicants was known, show that more women than men received 
loans. This can be interpreted to mean that more women are involved in the 
type of business (petty trading) on which the scheme focuses. Since it was not 
possible to obtain a breakdown of the types of business activities, further 
investigation would be required to confirm this. 
The number of applications and beneficiaries in both states shows wide 
public awareness of the scheme and a substantial amount of loan funds already 
disbursed. There is also significant unsatisfied demand, as reflected by the 
difference between the number who applied for a loan in Lagos State and the 
number who eventually received one. This situation could be attributed to 
factors including the inability of applicants to meet the loan conditions or the 
insufficiency of available loanable funds. 
The default rate, which in this case represents those who have failed to pay 
on the due date, is quite low. In Oyo State, where data were available, only 88 
borrowers (86 farmers and 2 traders) representing only 2 per cent of total 
beneficiaries were unable to pay on the due date. The farmers were waiting to 
harvest their crops, while the traders wanted to pay en bloc. 
Table 11 Applications and loan disbursements by the People's Bank in Lagos and Oyo states 
Lagos State 
Local 
government area 
Applications received (no.] 
Male Female Total 
Disbursement (naira) 
Male Female Total 
Total 
disbursed 
Maroko 618 2,228 2,886 384 692 1,076 138,000 
Agege 528 1,488 2,016 547 984 1,581 995,000 
Ajegunle 452 706 1,358 265 510 775 671,000 
Epe 482 453 935 296 326 622 212,000 
Ikorodu 475 417 892 296 315 611 202,000 
Badagry 474 319 793 208 280 488 97,000 
Muslim 542 1,464 2,006 388 510 898 995,000 
Total 3,571 7,135 10,886 2,384 3,617 6,101 2,410,000 
cont 
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Table 11 cont.. 
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Oyo State 
Local 
government area Beneficiaries (no.) Disbursement (naira) 
Ibadan 2,776 2,070,690 
Otu 1,015 523,750 
Ada 325 225,450 
Osu 290 199,050 
Total 4,396 3,018,940 
Source: extracted from records of the People's Bank headquarters in Lagos and 
Ibadan 
The People's Bank scheme appears to be by far the most innovative of all 
government schemes introduced so far to redress the imbalance caused by past 
government policies which discriminated against small-scale enterprises in 
Nigeria. The strength of this scheme lies in its simplified operations coupled 
with the promptness in loan procurement, both of which generally characterize 
the operations of the informal financial institutions. This is consistent with the 
suggestion by Box (1983) that the characteristics of the informal financial 
market or its structures could be used to develop small-scale enterprises in 
Nigeria. 
The experience so far with the operation of the People's Bank — with 
collateral de-emphasized, low transaction costs and promptness of attention, 
and very little bad debt experience (guaranteed through in-built mechanisms 
of the system) — makes a strong case for adoption of more informal credit 
market structures for SMEs in Nigeria. There is, however, a caveat. With the 
increased interest rate (from 5 to 15 per cent), and considering the type of 
business activities undertaken by many borrowers from this scheme, one 
wonders whether they can cover the cost of capital and in the end break even. 
Is it possible to adopt the informal credit market structures for SMEs in 
Nigeria or elsewhere? Does experience indicate that informal financial 
institutions should continue to exist as a separate and recognized sector, or to 
operate side-by-side with formal financial institutions? 
V Summary and conclusions 
The results of this study show that much initial financing for SMEs came from 
personal savings of the operators themselves and from formal financial 
institutions, while additional financing came mainly from informal sources. 
This demonstrates that, as they develop, SMEs are financed increasingly by the 
informal financial institutions. It also shows a complementary relationship 
between the formal and informal financial institutions, with both providing 
resources to SMEs. 
In principle, Nigerian small-scale enterprises can be said to make a valuable 
contribution to the economy, although this study has not addressed the 
specifics of that contribution. However, this study has shown that, by their 
nature, these enterprises have insufficient access to formal financial 
institutions, and as a result, rely more and more on their own or friends' and 
relatives' savings, and on informal financial institutions for investment capital. 
Thus, government policies aimed at the creation of a favourable environment 
for informal institutions are necessary to ensure their survival. 
It has been shown that some existing government policies may be 
detrimental to the SMEs' development, whereas some have been designed to 
encourage them. Of those examined in this study, many of the enterprises that 
failed were operated by sole proprietors with minimal educational background 
or business experience. These enterprises often relied heavily on imported 
components, and were in many cases unaware of existing government 
incentives from which they could benefit. While on the one hand the 
respondents identified government policies as being responsible for their 
difficulties, on the other hand the respondents were unaware of the various 
incentives and credit facilities provided by the government. For example, about 
75 per cent of the respondents were unaware of the "Work-For-Yourself" 
programme; 70 per cent were unaware of the National Economic 
Reconstruction Fund Programme; 81 per cent were unaware of the Small-to-
Medium-Scale Enterprises Loan Scheme; and 79 per cent were unaware of the 
Small-Scale Industries Credit Scheme. To improve their chances of success, 
the government could do more to publicize the existence,of these programmes 
which target SMEs. 
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The extent to which the level of education affected performance of the 
operators could not be determined clearly from the study. Although 88 per cent 
of the operators of those enterprises that failed had secondary education, about 
49 per cent of the operators of the enterprises that did not fail had only 
primary education. Other than avoiding failure, the extent to which those 
enterprises run by the primary education graduates performed could not be 
determined. Primary and secondary schools in Nigeria, until recently, did not 
expose their students to management and business-related courses. Further 
research would be useful on whether such people with no business or 
management education can succeed as managers. 
Nonetheless, the authors are of the opinion that a low level of education 
with no complementary training and experience can negatively affect business 
operations in several ways: 
8 The operators, particularly those with only primary education, may not 
know the sources of credit available to them in the market (see Table 5). 
° Their ability to prepare bankable projects may be adversely affected as 
many of the operators do not want to utilize the services of outside 
consultants. This was confirmed when they were asked whether they 
prepare feasibility reports before embarking on their projects. 
® These operators are not likely to be familiar with the various incentives 
which they could utilize to improve the effectiveness of their businesses 
(Table 5). 
® These operators are unlikely to meet the more stringent application 
requirements of the formal financial institutions, and their financing options 
may be limited to informal institutions. 
The introduction of the People's Bank, its unique- operational modalities, 
and its apparently effective performance so far seem to confirm the argument 
that financial institutions adopting the positive features of informal financial 
institutions can contribute a lot more than the formal financial institutions in 
financing small-scale enterprise in Nigeria. For example, if small enterprises 
actually comprise the majority of those now patronizing the People's Bank, it 
could be argued that such enterprises tend to rely more on informal than on 
formal financial institutions, especially due to their lack of start-up capital or 
collateral. 
The reliability and relevance of all of this study's-findings are limited by 
the lack of a clear definition of Nigerian small-scale enterprise and of a 
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realistic differentiation between small-scale and medium-scale enterprises. 
Grouping the two together tends to bury the real problems of each group and 
of the sector as a whole. Based on the authors' intimate knowledge of the 
environment, the findings of this study probably relate more to the medium-
scale than to small-scale enterprises. However, more research needs to be 
undertaken to clarify these issues. 
Notes 
1. Esusu is a name given by the Yorubas of Nigeria to a particular type of 
informal credit institution organized and operated mainly by farmers, petty 
traders, craftspeople, social clubs, teachers, civil servants, etc. It is a major 
and popular form of informal financial institution which is identified across 
Africa. It is also called susu, adashi, sanduk, tontines and hangbad in 
Ghana, Chad, Sudan, Cameroon and Somalia, respectively. 
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